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ABSTRACT
With millions of apps that can be downloaded from official or third-
party market, Android has become one of the most popular mobile
platforms today. These apps help people in all kinds of ways and
thus have access to lots of user’s data that in general fall into three
categories: sensitive data, data to be shared with other apps, and
non-sensitive data not to be shared with others. For the first and
second type of data, Android has provided very good storage mod-
els: an app’s private sensitive data are saved to its private folder
that can only be access by the app itself, and the data to be shared
are saved to public storage (either the external SD card or the em-
ulated SD card area on internal FLASH memory). But for the last
type, i.e., an app’s non-sensitive and non-shared data, we found that
there is a big problem in Android’s current storage model which es-
sentially encourages an app to save its non-sensitive data to shared
public storage that can be access freely by all other apps.
At first glance, it seems no problem to do so, as those data are
non-sensitive after all, but it implicitly assumes that the app de-
velopers could correctly identify all sensitive data and prevent all
possible information leakage from private-but-non-sensitive data.
In this paper, we will demonstrate that this is an invalid assump-
tion with a thorough survey on information leaks of those apps
that had followed Android’s recommended storage model for non-
sensitive data. Our studies showed that highly sensitive information
from billions of users can be easily hacked by exploiting the men-
tioned problematic storage model. Although our empirical studies
are based on a limited set of apps, the identified problems are never
isolated or accidental bugs of those apps being investigated. On the
contrary, the problem is rooted from the vulnerable storage model
recommended by Android (even including the latest Android 4.4
at the time of writing). To mitigate the threat, we also propose a
defense framework.
1. INTRODUCTION
∗All vulnerabilities described in this paper have been reported to
corresponding companies. Alipay has fixed this vulnerability in the
latest version. We have got the IRB approval before all experiments
related to human subjects.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies
bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific
permission and/or a fee.
Copyright 20XX ACM X-XXXXX-XX-X/XX/XX ...$15.00.
The last decade has seen the immerse evolvement of smartphone
technologies. Today’s smartphones carry much more functionali-
ties than plain phones, including email checking, social network-
ing, gaming and entertainment. These emerging functionalities are
largely supported by the vast amount of mobile applications (apps).
As reported by [3], the number of Android apps on Google Play is
hitting 137 million.
When apps are performing their tasks, it is inevitable for them
to touch our private information, like emails, contacts, various ac-
counts, etc. Generally, when people download and install an app,
they trust it and hope it could protect their private information care-
fully. To support the protection of private data, Android system al-
located for each app a private folder that can only be accessed by
the owner app.
Since each app now has it own private folder, it seems natural
and absolutely right to save all private data that should not be shared
with others to this secure folder, but unfortunately, according to our
survey to be presented in section 4, this is not the case. We found
that, for private data, many apps will first try to decide what are
sensitive and what are not, then only store the identified sensitive
private data to the secure private folder, and save the other non-
sensitive private data to a “private” folder on shared public storage,
even though the data should never be shared with other apps.
Although there are some reasons and benefits by differentiating
sensitive private data from non-sensitive private data and save the
latter to shared public storage, which will be discussed in section 7,
we believe that such practice is wrong and could lead to serious at-
tacks. App’s private data, which are not supposed to be shared with
other apps, should never be saved to shared public storage, no mat-
ter the private data is identified as sensitive or not. Since most app
developers are not experts in security and privacy, thus could make
wrong decisions on what are sensitive and what are not. According
to our survey in Section 4, we indeed have found some very popu-
lar apps leak information that are obvious sensitive (like full name,
phone numbers, and etc), which shows even the companies with
highly reputation are not so credible under such a wrong storage
model. What’s worse, even all developers have made the right de-
cisions on each piece of information generated by their own apps, it
would still be problematic, because non-sensitive information from
multiple apps/sources could become sensitive and lead to serious
privacy attacks. In section 4, we will give examples of informa-
tion that is not sensitive at first glance, but has huge privacy impact
when combined with other public information. Some examples de-
scribed in Section 5 demonstrate how such non-obvious sensitive
information could be used in serious privacy attacks.
Surprisingly, the storage model is still recommended in official
Android documents, and the latest Android 4.4 emphasized a mis-
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leading concept called “app-private directory”. Following state-
ment is quoted from official Android developer documents 1: “If
you are handling files that are not intended for other apps to use,
you should use a private storage directory on the external stor-
age by calling getExternalFilesDir()”. According to the same page,
the external storage is defined as a place to “store public data on
the shared external storage”. So, this guideline is actually asking
apps to save app-private data to shared public storage. More rele-
vant details on storage security in latest Android 4.4 will be given
in section 3.
Although it has been a hot topic to sniff and infer sensitive infor-
mation from Android devices and there are a number of researches
demonstrating how to launch attacks successfully, the work pre-
sented in this paper is different. Here, we want to report a serious
problem of wrong private data storage model that has been followed
by many apps for years, while the previous works either trick the
user to grant high-profile permissions [22] or exploit the system
flaws in side-channel attacks [29]. It is also worth noting that the
attacks proposed in this paper are new and different from attacks
have been reported, even if the target is the same app. For exam-
ple, our second attack against WhatsApp is based on non-obvious
sensitive data (photo names), while the attack reported [19] took
WhatsApp database as the target, and our attack succeeds in its
latest version, even after the reported vulnerability was fixed.
Since the reported problem goes beyond the vulnerability of any
specific app, current data protection mechanisms, like data encryp-
tion, do not work well. To address this problem, developers may be
required to update their codes by saving all private data to the se-
curely protected private folder instead of the one located on shared
public storage. However, expecting all the developers to obey the
security rules and fix this security issue is impractical. Another
more effective solution requires some updates to Android system
by enforcing fine-grained access control on “app-private” data. In
order to mitigate this problem as much as possible, while also avoid
bringing unnecessary trouble to users, we propose to argument the
existing security framework on public storage by instrumenting the
original APIs and automatically checking the ownership of files and
directories.
Our Contributions. We summarize our contributions as fol-
lows:
• We revisit the Android data storage model and first study 17
popular Android apps on whether they store the data cor-
rectly. Our study reveals that 13 apps (billions installations
on smartphones in total2) leave user’s private information on
shared storage, which lead to highly privacy risks. Then, a
large scale analysis conducted shows such a roblem is widely
exist among apps, which means it is not a bug happens on
several apps but a wrong storage model provided for devel-
opers.
• We design three concrete attacks based on the sensitive infor-
mation collected from the popular apps, including inferring
user’s location (WeChat), identifying the owners of phone
numbers acquired from WhatsApp, and inferring the chat-
ting buddy (KakaoTalk). These attacks are new and achieve
high accuracy while also remain low-profile.
• We discuss the feasibility of the existing solutions on pro-
tecting data in shared public storage and propose our mitiga-
1http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/
data/data-storage.html
2The detailed statistical data are shown in Table 2 and Figure 3,
which actually contain installations on other platforms except An-
droid, but Android have a big advantage in the size of these users.
tion approach to protect app-private data. What’s more, we
also discuss the fundamental reasons lies behind the coarse-
grained access control mechanism on shared public storage
in Section 7.
Roadmap. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We
begin with the adversary model taken by this paper – Section 2, as
well as an overview of Android storage model in Section 3. Sec-
tion 4 shows our surveys on private information leakage of An-
droid apps. Three concrete attacks will be introduced in Section
5. Section 6 is devoted to corresponding defense technologies, and
in Section 7, we will discuss the fundamental reasons lead to this
problem and also some limitations of this paper. We compare our
work with prior related research in Section 8. Finally, Section 9
concludes this paper.
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Figure 1: Top 10 Permissions Requested by 34369 Apps
2. ADVERSARY MODEL
The adversary studied in our paper is interested in privacy at-
tacks by only exploiting the app-private data located on shared
public storage due to the wrong model introduced in this paper.
In order to get app-private data and perform our attacks, it is as-
sumed that a malicious app with access to external storage (i.e., the
READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE or WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
permission, READ and WRITE for short) and the Internet (i.e., the
INTERNET permission) has been installed successfully on an An-
droid phone updated to latest version (Android 4.4). The mali-
cious app will read certain app-private folders selectively on shared
public storage, searching for information that can be used for pri-
vacy attack, and then upload such information to a malicious server
where the intensive data analysis and concrete attacks will be done.
Note that there is no need to scan the whole shared storage or up-
load all app-private data, because it is reasonable to assume that
the adversary has studied many apps in the market beforehand and
already know where to read and how to extract useful information
from app-private data.
Based on above assumptions, it is hard to detect the attack. First,
it requires only two very common permissions. We did a statistical
analysis on the permissions requested by 34369 apps, the top 10
permissions are shown in the Figure 1. About 94% of apps request
INTERNET permission, and about 85% of apps request the per-
mission to access external storage, ranking No.1 and No.3 respec-
tively. Secondly, it only uploads data when Wi-Fi is available and
filter out non-useful app-private data to minimize data size. Third,
all network- and CPU-intensive operations are done on a remote
malicious server instead of the mobile phone, which can eliminate
the alarm in CPU and power usage. Finally, the malicious app will
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Figure 2: Overview of Android storage options and security
not take any other malicious behavior to help the attack, like ex-
ploiting other system vulnerabilities or bypassing existing security
mechanisms, so it is hard to be tagged as malicious by current anti-
virus software. The victim of such attack could be the owner of the
compromised Android phone. However, depends on on the apps in-
stalled and the information leaked through app-private data, attacks
can be extended to user’s family members, friends and colleagues.
3. OVERVIEW OF ANDROID STORAGE
MODEL
In Android system, there are several different storage options
which, according to their access control mechanisms, can be di-
vided into three categories: system, app-specific, and public, as
shown in Figure 2. The system storage is the directory where the
whole Android OS locates, and protected by Linux access control
mechanism. The app-specific storages are places that are under
control of a specific app (i.e., the owner of these folders), and can
only be read and written by that app. Android system provides
three types of app-specific storage: internal storage 3, shared pref-
erences, and SQLite databases. The last storage option is shared
public storage which is used to share data among apps, like down-
loaded documents, video, photos, etc.
As shown in Figure 2, for system and app-specific storage, An-
droid relies on the Discretionary Access Control mechanism pro-
vided by underlying Linux Ext2/4 file system to enforce access
control. Android create an account for each app (UID) and system
process which would be the owner of a specific folder and controls
who can access that folder. However, there is no fine grained access
control on shared public storage which is only protected with READ
and WRITE permissions. As a result, an app can read or write any
folder at any time once it has acquired corresponding permissions.
The Android system even sets the permissions to rwxrwx--- for
the shared public folders on built-in Flash memory that were orig-
inally protected by Ext2/4 with fine grained access control mecha-
nism, which we believe is to emulate the behavior of FAT file sys-
tem and be consistent with the one used on SD card.
Misleading of new features on Android 4.4. There are several
security enhancements on the shared public storage in the latest An-
droid 4.4, which could give people a false sense that Android 4.4
is immune from the attacks introduced here. First, it emphasized
3The name “internal storage” is actually very confusing. It should
be understood as “being accessed only by app internal code” in-
stead of the physical location of the storage (i.e., build-in Flash
memory), because Android also uses a term “external storage”
that is shared public storage and could be either on build-in Flash-
memory or SD card.
the concept “app-private directory”, that are not intended for other
apps to use, and app reads or writes files in its own private directory
does not require READ or WRITE permissions [17]. At first glance,
many people, even including some security experts, may think that
the Android system will save the app-private data in secure places,
and the problem discussed in this paper is gone. However, that is to-
tally wrong! The Android system actually creates a folder (named
“./android/data/”) on shared public storage to save all app-private
data. As mentioned above, there is no fine grained access control
on shared public storage, any app with appropriate permission thus
can access those app-private data and apply privacy attacks.
Another misleading feature introduced in latest Android 4.4 is
the permission WRITE_MEDIA_STORAGE. This permission con-
trols the write operation on real SD card and will only be granted to
system process. It can be taken as a non-public permission, which
means normal apps could not write to real SD card. However, there
is no dedicated permission to control the read operation on SD card,
which makes the latest Android version still vulnerable to the attack
on the wrong app-private storage model. This has been confirmed
by our home-brewed apps and third-party apps downloaded from
Google Play market.
4. SURVEY ON INFORMATION LEAKS
FROM SHARED STORAGE
It is true that some app-private data are not sensitive. However,
the model of letting app write their private data to shared public
storage relies on a strong assumption that app developers can made
right decision to tell sensitive data from non-sensitive ones. In this
Section, we will present a survey of the information leaks through
the app-private data saved on shared public storage, which will
show that such assumption is problematic. The survey includes two
parts: the first is a detailed examination of information in “shared”
app-private data for 17 popular apps (in Section 4.1), and the other
is a more general and large scale study on the “shared” app-private
data on public storage (in Section 4.2).
4.1 Investigation on popular apps
What apps have been surveyed. According to our adversary model,
the attackers are interested in privacy attacks over “shared” app-
private data, so we have selected 17 most popular apps on Google
Play from three categories: “social networking”, “instant messag-
ing” and “online payment”, which are believed to be more likely to
touch users’ sensitive information. The apps, including their user
numbers, are shown in Figure 3, while the versions of these apps
installed on our mobile phones are list in the Appendix A.
How to check the app-private data. These 17 apps are down-
loaded and installed on all three Samsung Galaxy S3 mobile phones.
Then we manually simulate three different users on three phones
respectively, including account registration, adding good friends,
sending message, etc. Finally, we check the shared public storage,
search sensitive data for each app, and classify the collected data.
How the information is leaked. By studying the 17 sample apps,
we found 10 of them leak various user-related information through
app-private data on shared public storage, including full name, ac-
count name and emails, etc., as shown in Table 1. Such information
is leaked in different forms which will discussed below, and the de-
tails of extraction is elaborated in Appendix B.
Leak through text file: Some apps store user’s profile into a text
file. For example, Viber directly saves user’s real name, phone
number and path of profile photo into a plain-text file ∼/viber/
.viber/.userdata without any encryption (∼ represents the
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Figure 3: The number of users installed the 17 popular apps (Details are shown in the Appendix with citations)
Table 1: Sensitive data acquired from Smartphone A
Sensitive
Information App Name Content/Remarks
User Identity
Viber Name
Renren UID
Weibo UID
Linkedin Profile photo
Phone Number
Viber 8525984xxxx
Alipay 1521944xxxx
EasyChat 8525984xxxx
Email Weibo lixxxxxxx@163.com
Renren? lixxxxxxx@gmail.com
Account
Tencent QQ 8387xxxxx
Renren 2388xxxxx
Momo 3120xxxx
Weibo 2648xxxxxx
WeChat QQ account / Phone number
Connection
EasyChat Call Records
Linkedin Profile photos
KakaoTalk Names of content directories
WhatsApp Phone Numbers of Friends:1213572xxxx ...
Renren Accounts of Friends:8295xxxxx ...
? The Email found by grep command in Table 1 is from a “log.txt”
file left by Renren old version (5.9.4).
root directory of public storage). User’s username, email address4
are stored by Weibo in a file named by the user’s UID. Some apps
keep text logs which also reveal quite rich information. EasyChat
keeps call records in a file ∼/Yixin/log/pjsip_log.txt,
so caller’s number, callee’s number and call duration can be easily
recovered by simply parsing each record.
Leak through photo: The social network apps usually cache user
profile photos in shared public storage, like LinkedIn in our stud-
ies. The photo itself is non-obvious sensitive information, since we
can easily get millions of such photos with Google. However, our
study shows user’s LinkedIn profile photos can be linked to her
identity with high possibility, as shown in Figure 4.
Leak through file name: We found several apps organize data re-
lated to a person or friends into a dedicated file named with sensi-
tive or non-obvious sensitive information. For example, WhatsApp
stores user’s friends photos in the path ∼/WhatsApp/Profile
pictures/ with that friend’s phone number as file name. They
seem meaningless but could have significant privacy implications
when combined with other public information, for example, the
4If the user uses email to register Weibo account. The user also can
use phone number to register an account.
Figure 4: The result of searching a user’s Linkedin profile
photo
data from social networks. A sample attack will given in Section 5
to show that how these non-obvious sensitive information could be
used in privacy attacks.
Leak through folder name: Some apps use account name as folder
name directly, like Renren, Momo. KaokaoTalk will create a
folder with the same name in two users’ phones if they chatted
with each other. We also find that a file sent to each other will have
the same file name and saved in the same path. Such a naming
convention reveals the connections among people, and even can be
leveraged to infer user’s chat history.
Leak through other file: Files left by uninstalled apps or put by the
user may also disclose user’s information, like email addresses. We
leverage the command /system/bin/sh -c grep -r @xxx.com path to
match and extract email addresses from files (only three types, .txt,
.doc(x), .pdf) in shared storage.
What information has been leaked. As shown in Table 1, there
is indeed some important sensitive information leaked through the
app-private data on shared public storage. To better understand the
privacy implication of such leak, it is better to use
Personal Identifiable Information (PII) [32], a well-known defi-
nition for private data, to classify and evaluate the leaked informa-
tion. We defined two categories of sensitive data, Obvious sensitive
data and Non-obvious sensitive data, by refining the concept of PII
as below:
• Obvious sensitive data. It contains identifiers in PII re-
lated to user’s real-world identity, including full name, phone
numbers, addresses, date of birth, social security number,
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driver’s license id, credit card numbers, etc.
• Non-obvious sensitive data. It contains identifiers in PII
related to user’s virtual-world identity and also her friends’
information. The virtual-world identifiers include email ad-
dresses, account name, profile photos, etc. We also consider
the friends’ information as shown in previous works [34],
they can be used to uniquely identify the user.
According to the definition, we divided the surveyed apps into
three categories with privacy protection level from high to low,
based on the type of sensitive data revealed. Table 2 shows the
results of our evaluation.
Table 2: Privacy protection level of the 17 apps
Privacy level App Name Remarks
FFF Facebook, Twitter,Instagram, Skype No comments
FF Line, Vine, WeChat Audio fileswithout encryption
F
WhatsApp, Linkedin,
Viber, KakaoTalk,
Tencent QQ, Alipay,
Renren, Weibo,
Momo, EasyChat
Detailed problems are
shown in Appendix B
How to infer user’s identity. Without doubt, user’s identity in-
formation is a key issue in any privacy research. We present 5
approaches to get a user’s identity information by leveraging the
sensitive data acquired, shown as follows:
• A user’s name and profile photo can be acquired from Viber.
• A user’s identity can be acquired by searching her Renren
UID.
• A user’s identity can be acquired by searching her Weibo
Username/UID.
• A user’s identity can be acquired by searching the user’s
Linkedin profile photo on Google image search.
• We could find someone on Facebook with a high probability
by the email addresses extracted from shared public storage
and also the usernames acquired from other apps, since peo-
ple prefer to use the same username and email address among
their various social networking apps [11].
Apparently, leaking obvious sensitive data should be prohibited
and requires immediate actions from the app developers and An-
droid developing team. The damage of leaking non-obvious sensi-
tive data is less clear. For instance, attackers holding a user’s photo
still have no way to learn her real-world identity unless the user is
famous or acquainted to attackers. However, our research shows it
is possible to infer obvious sensitive data from non-obvious ones
(in Section 5) and the latter should also be well protected.
4.2 Investigation on apps with a large scale
The above analysis shows that all 17 popular apps have saved
their app-private data to shared public storage, and 10 of them have
leaked lots of privacy-related information. In order to have a better
understanding of the scale and seriousness of this issue, it is nec-
essary for us to investigate more apps. However, this is a difficult
task in general, because accurate evaluation relies on intensive use
of these apps, including account registration, sending message, and
etc. Too many deep simulation of people daily use operations will
make dynamic analysis tools not effective, especially can not scale
to the large number of Android apps. Therefore, we take static
analysis instead, the basic idea is scanning the app code for spe-
cific patterns that indicates the written of app-private data on shared
public storage. Again, we only focus on the three categories that
are most likely to touch user’s sensitive information, so we selected
1648 different apps from our app repository (including 34369 apps
downloaded previously).
The previous static analysis on apps, like [27, 20], convert the
app code from the DEX format to a JAR or Java source code, and
then leverage WALA [26] or Soot [40] to complete the further anal-
ysis. Such analysis methods are intuitive and easily to operate, but
in general, some information will be lost when converting app code
to JAR or Java source code. Therefore, we leveraged Apktool [4]
to decompile apk to smali code which contain all the original apk
information, and even can be repackaged to a new app. Then we
did static analysis directly on the smali code.
Determining whether app-private data is really sensitive or not
requires more knowledge of the app itself and even combining with
other app’s information, therefore is difficult to automate. We think
an app is highly risk if it intends to create “sensitive” app-private
folders or files on shared public storage. Specifically, “sensitive”
app-private folder or file needs contain at least one of the following
keywords, including log, cache, files, file, data, temp,
tmp, account, meta, uid, history, which are learned from
the apps by heuristic. For each keyword, we define our patterns
similar to “whole word match” in Linux, but has more restric-
tions. For example, the patterns of keyword log contain folders
(/user_log, /log, ...) and files (user_log.txt, user.log,
...). What’s more, we build a control flow graph (CFG) of an app’s
smali code to confirm whether the “sensitive” data is truly writ-
ten on the shared public storage, since the data may be written in
internal storage or some other secure places. In general, there are
several ways to get the path of shared public storage, we summa-
rize them and shown in Table 3. Also, we consider developers use
general methods to create files (e,g., FileOutputStream) and
folders (e.g., mkdir), and ignore the situations that developers use
linux system commands to create files (like touch).
We marked each function f in the CFG based on the following
three criteria:
• Whether it contains at least one of the methods described in
Table 3.
• Whether it contains at least one of the patterns we defined
above.
• Whether it uses FileOutputStream to create files or mk-
dir to make folders.
Table 3: Methods of getting path of shared public storage
Category Methods
Call API
getExternalStorageDirectory()
getExternalStoragePublicDirectory()
getExternalFilesDir()
getExternalFilesDirs()
getExternalCacheDir()
getExternalCacheDirs()
Hardcode Path “/sdcard”, “/sdcard0”, “/sdcard1”
We implemented our detecting method (shown in Algorithm 1)
on the marked CFG after the above processes, the depth parameter
was set as 3 according to our experience. The results show that
489 apps from the 1648 apps being analyzed intend to write some
5
app-private data to shared storage. However, such a static scanning
method has its limitations. So, we randomly chose 30 apps from
the 489 suspicious apps, and manually operated these apps and did
our evaluation, just like the work performed on the popular apps.
The result shows that 27 apps truly wrote app-private data in shared
public storage, which indicates such a privacy leakage problem re-
vealed in this paper is widely exist and very serious among apps.
Also, the false positive of our method is low.
Algorithm 1 : Detecting vulnerable apps
Input: Class_set C, Keyword_Patterns_set KS, Path_API_set
PA, Write_API_set WA
Output: bool sensitive
1: for class c in C do
2: for function f in c do
3: condition.clear();
4: DFS(f , depth);
5: if condition == Union(KS, PA, WA) then
6: return true;
7: end if
8: end for
9: end for
10: return false;
11:
12: procedure DFS(function f , int depth)
13: if depth == 0 then
14: return;
15: end if
16: for all element e in f .mark do
17: condition(e)=true;
18: end for
19: for all callee ce of f do
20: DFS(ce, depth-1);
21: end for
22: end procedure
5. ATTACKS BASED ON NON-OBVIOUS
SENSITIVE DATA
In this section, we present three example attacks based on the
non-obvious sensitive information extracted from app-private data
saved on shared public storage. We begin with a brief introduction
to the design of a malicious Android app called SAPD (“Smuggle
App-Private Data”), followed by detailed description of three con-
crete attacks: attacking victim’s location, identifying the owners of
the phone numbers acquired from WhatsApp friends list, and even
getting chatting buddy and user’s chat history. Again, we want to
emphasize is that the three attacks are different from previous at-
tacks which have been reported.
5.1 Attack preparation
Since it is assumed that attackers have already studied the vulner-
able apps and know where and how to get useful information from
app-private data, the natural next step is to develop a malicious app
that could dig out and upload such information to a server under
their control. As the result, the malicious app need have permis-
sions to access (more accurately, to read) shared public storage and
Internet. As discussed in section 2, such permissions are common
and not alarming.
The weakest part of this malicious app might be the potential
outstanding network traffic footprint, especially for users with lim-
ited 3G plan. We implemented two optimizations in our app pro-
totype SAPD to get around this limitation. First, try to minimize
the uploaded data. For example, for information leaked through
file name or folder name, it is only necessary to upload the list
of file names instead of the whole file. Another optimization is
to upload data only when a Wi-Fi network is available. It can
be achieved by simplely using the WiFiManager class provided
by Android SDK, with the cost of requesting an extra permission
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE. However, SAPD achieved the same goal
by reading public available files in procfs from Linux kernel of An-
droid. More specifically, Android put the parameters of Address
Resolution Protocol in file /proc/net/arp and other wireless
activities in /proc/net/wireless, so by reading above files,
SAPD is able to know whether a WiFi network is connected or not.
After having extracted the useful information and identified ap-
propriate data uploading timing, the last thing that SAPD will do
is just sending the data out to a malicious server where all subse-
quent attacking steps will taken place. To minimize the possibilities
of being caught due to suspicious CPU usage or abnormal battery
consumptions, SAPD only reads and uploads filtered useful data,
and it will never perform any kind of intensive computations or
Internet communications.
5.2 Inferring your location
In this section, we describe our attack on inferring user’s location
from data in shared storage. Location of a phone user is considered
as sensitive from the very beginning and there are already a lot
of research works on inference attacks and protections. In recent
years, location-based social discovery (LBSD) is becoming popu-
lar and is widely adopted by mobile apps. The locations of users
are updated and viewable by friends or even strangers. For the lat-
ter case, to protect user’s privacy, only distance between the user
and the viewer is revealed. However, recent works show such pro-
tection is very weak. Chen et al. analyzes LBSD in large-scale and
also shows it is possible to re-identify user with high precision [23].
A recent work by Li et al. demonstrates that the geo-location of
user can be revealed [30]. Our attack also aims to identify user’s
location from LBSD network but we make improvements by com-
bining the profile information extracted from victim’s phone. We
show the attack would be more accurate and could be a realistic
threat. As a showcase, we demonstrate our attack on WeChat app.
The LBSD module in WeChat is called “People Nearby”, through
which, the user can view information of other users within a cer-
tain distance. The public information includes nick name, profile
photo, posts (called What’s Up), region (city-level) and gender. As
described in section 4.1, the user’s phone number or QQ userid is
left by WeChat on shared storage. These information will be col-
lected by SAPD we built and sent to one of our servers (denoted
as S1). These servers are installed with emulated Android envi-
ronment for running WeChat app. S1 will query the server of Ten-
cent (the company operating WeChat) for profile information. In
the meantime, attacker needs to instruct another server (denoted as
S2) to run WeChat using fake geolocations, checks People Nearby
and downloads all the profile information and the corresponding
distances from discovered nearby users. The profile information
from S1 is then compared with the grabbed profile information
(downloads from S2) in another server (denoted as S3) followed
the steps shown in Figure 6. If a match happens, S2 will continue
to query People Nearby for two more times using different geolo-
cation (faked) to get two new distances. Through the three point
positioning method, the target’s accurate location can be inferred.
Since the target user may keep moving, the three servers need to
synchronize on user’s information. Figure 5 shows the processes
of our attack and we elaborate the technical details in each stage as
below:
Getting Users’ WeChat Account. Though WeChat userid is not
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Figure 5: The schematic diagram of location attack
stored on shared storage, QQ userid and phone number are stored
instead. They are binded to WeChat account and has to be unique
for each user. Therefore, our app collects these two data and sends
them to our server S1 for profile querying. Getting Users’ Profile
Information. Next, the attacker uses QQ userid or phone num-
ber to query Tencent server for user’s profile information. The re-
turned profile consists of 5 fields: nick name, profile photo, posts
(What’s Up), region and gender. Our task is to assign the location
information for this profile. Unfortunately, this field is not pro-
vided directly from Tencent server and updated according to the
user’s geo-location. What we do here is to run WeChat on another
server S2, frequently refresh People Nearby to get as many pro-
files and distances till a profile match happens, and use the cor-
responding distances to infer her location. A challenge here is to
extract the profile and distances from WeChat app, as there is no
interface exposed from WeChat to export these information. Af-
ter we decompile its code, we found the app invokes an Android
API setText from android.widget.TextView to render
the text on screen whenever a profile is viewed. We therefore in-
strument this API and dump all the texts related to profiles into logs.
This helps us to extract the Nickname, What’s Up, and Region. In
general, we can distinguish a people from others based on these
three features. However, it is also possible (with very low possibil-
ity) that different profiles have the same values of these three fields.
If such a situation happens, we extract the size of profile photo and
consider it in the matching process. We do not use the photo content
since the comparing is more time-consuming and size is enough.
Comparing process. The comparison processes in S3 are shown
in Figure 6. The first step we need to compare the Nickname from
S1 and S2, if they are the same, we will continue to compare their
What’s Up information, if the What’s Up are not blank and the
same, we think the two users are the same person. If the What’s Up
information is different or blank, we will continue to compare their
profile photos’ size for another round of check. We add this ad-
ditional step since the user could post new What’s Up information
while our profile information stored on S1 has not been updated
to the latest status. Here we use “Shark for Root” [14], a network
traffic capturer to intercept the packets and extract the photo size
information from pcap file.
If a match happens, we get another two distances between the
target and our faked coordinates to calculate the target’s location.
We use an app called “Fake GPS location” [7] to fake the server’s
geolocation to different places. To make WeChat work more stable
Nickname?
What’s Up?
Photo Size?
Different Person
No/(Null)
Yes
Yes
(Not Null)
Same Person Different Person
NoYes
Figure 6: The processes of profile information comparison
when this app fakes GPS, “Allow mock locations” option has to
be turned off. This is achieved through setting the access right of
the directory /system as rw and then moving “com.lexa.fakegps-
1.apk” from /data/app to /system/app. We also enable the
“GPS satellites” option in Location services to let apps use GPS to
pinpoint the location. Meanwhile, the “Google’s location service”
option was disabled to limit apps using data from Wi-Fi and mobile
networks determining the approximate location.
We first set the default location of “Fake GPS location” to a spot
within our university. For the densely populated places, we added
several more anchor points. Since People Nearby only display lim-
ited amount of users (about 100), using more anchor points and
merging the list of discovered people will increase the chance of
hitting the target user. Next, we use a script to automatically refresh
People Nearby. For each point, to load all the people’s information
appeared in People Nearby, the script clicks on the links to people’s
profile one-by-one through triggering event KEYCODE_DPAD_DOWN.
This process has to request data from Tencent. To avoid raising
alarm from Tencent, the script sleeps a while before changing to
a new anchor point. If someone we have known appeared in the
list of People Nearby, another WeChat will be launched to get new
two distances by mocking its GPS to another two locations near
the place. With the help of a program which implements the three
point positioning algorithm, we can easily calculate her location.
Attack evaluation. We evaluate our attack on 20 participants.
Each participant has installed WeChat with People Nearby turned
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on (so their profiles will be open to view). Our attack successfully
reveal the live locations for most of the participants and are veri-
fied by them. To point out, some of the inferred locations are not
exact where the user stays, but they are all within accepted within
the acceptable range.
Linkedin/FB
Weibo/Renren  WhatsApp 
Profile
 Info
WhatsApp 
Contacts
Picture Phone
123
456
Name Picture
A
B
Figure 7: The diagram of attack user’s WhatsApp friends
5.3 Inferring your friends’ identities
Besides inferring the identity of the phone owner, the identities
of her friends are also attractive to the adversary, which could lead
to more accurate profiling of the phone owner or attacks against her
friends. However, achieving this goal for attacker is not straightfor-
ward. Let us take a look at WhatsApp, only the profile photos and
phone numbers of the user’s friends are accessible and it is difficult
for adversary to directly learn who they are. On the other hand,
studies have shown the internet users tend to use default privacy set-
tings of social network and expose their information (including full
name) to visitors even strangers [16]. Moreover, people tend to use
the same photo for different social networks [9]. These two obser-
vations inspire us to match the profile photos between WhatsApp
and social networks to infer the identities. Figure 7 illustrates this
attack and we elaborate the steps below:
Getting photos from WhatsApp. After adversary obtains the pho-
tos in victim’s phone, she could opt to transmit all of them to the
server for later analysis. However, this will incur a lot of network
overhead and is less stealthy. Instead, we leverage a special fea-
ture of WhatsApp server on adding friends to reduce the vol-
ume of data required for transmission. Specifically, a registered
WhatsApp user (say UA) can get the profile photo of any other
user (say UB) by adding phone number of UB into UA contact list,
and there is no need for permission from UB . Therefore, our mali-
cious app SAPD collect the phone numbers and compile them into
a standard contact file (with file extension .vcf) and send to our
server. After that, the attacker loads the file into her smartphone’s
contact list and then launch WhatsApp to download the profile
photos. To notice, downloading a profile photo is only triggered
when the account owner clicks user’ profile photo. Therefore, we
write a monkeyrunner script to automate this process by simulating
the clicks. Comparing to directly sending photos, this approach can
reduce about 3MB network traffic (taking 50 photos as an example)
and hence is very helpful to make SAPD more stealthy.
Getting photos from social networks. Since an internet user is
likely to use default privacy settings on social networks, her user
name, full name (if required), friends and etc. are usually open to
public. In particular, her friends’ photos are usually grouped to-
gether and stored into a her public gallery (e.g., user X’s friends’
photos are stored under https://www.facebook.com/X/friends).
We validate this setting in popular social network sites, including
Facebook, Linkedin, RenRen and Weibo and we believe this set-
ting should apply in most cases. In order to grab these photos,
user’s corresponding social network userid is required and is usu-
ally not direct available for the adversary. However, a large number
of users also install the mobile clients of these social networks and
our study already shows they tend to leave userid in shared storage
within the reach of attackers (Linkedin, RenRen and Weibo). In
case the userid is not directly revealed, we found user’s email can
be used in replace (Facebook). As shown in Section 4.1, emails
can be grabbed through scanning shared storage. After retrieving
user’s userid or email, we use a crawler built by ourselves to query
the websites and download all the friends’ photo and profile infor-
mation (e.g., full name and address) into attacker’s server.
Comparing photos. After we have the photos from WhatsApp
and social networks, the next step naturally is to find matches.
There are already a bunch of image matching techniques proposed
and some advanced ones are able to recognize faces and match
the photos of one person in different context. Using the advanced
ones would improve the chance of successful matching but it is also
time-consuming. In fact, simple algorithm, like sampling regions
and calculating similarity, is enough for our scenario as user prefer
to use the same profile photo in different social networks. There-
fore, we adopt a simple matching algorithm described in [10].
Attack evaluation. We evaluate this attack by running our devel-
oped app on the participant’s phone and also collect her friends’
profiles using the server we set up. The app is able to collect 50
profiles containing phone numbers and photo from her WhatsApp
contact. By searching the photos, we collect 29 social network pro-
files (12 from Linkedin, 19 from Facebook, 11 from Renren and 5
from Weibo, some are the same people) and they are all correctly
matched as verified by the participant. This result indicates the
phone user’s friends’ identities could be inferred with high chance
through our attack.
Figure 8: The contents folders of KakaoTalk on two smart-
phones
5.4 Inferring your chatting buddy
Instant messaging apps usually keep the chatting logs under shared
storage. In some cases, the logs are stored in plain text (e.g., Easy
Chat) and the list of user’s chatting buddies will be directly ex-
posed to the adversary. Encrypting the logs seems to fix the prob-
lem, but our attack on KakaoTalk shows the problem is still not
solved.
In fact, KakaoTalk creates an tag when conversation happens
and then dumps the attachments (e.g. photos and audio files) un-
der a folder named using the tag. As shown in Figure 8, the tag
between smartphone A and smartphone B is 87204252525678
(a 14-digit number). Though it is difficult to recover user IDs from
the tag, it is still feasible to infer the chatting buddies.
Assuming the malicious app SAPD is installed on a number of
phones, it will keep collecting the tags and transmitting them to
attacker’s server. When tags from two different phone match, it
is clear that the owners of the phones have chatted some time.
The chance of matching is relatively small considering the large
user base of KakaoTalk, however, attacker can leverage social-
engineering tricks (e.g., sending spams) to propagate SAPD from
the infected user only to her friends to increase the success rate.
After the entities of conversation inferred, the attacker could fur-
ther recover the time point for each chat by leveraging the creation
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time of attachment files.
6. DEFENSE
Our survey on popular Android apps shows leaks of sensitive
information from app-private data stored on public storage do exist.
Given the number of all apps in the wild, the issues we found are
very likely to be a tip of the iceberg. Against this problem, several
guidances and solutions are proposed but all of them incur huge
efforts from app developers and users. Instead, we propose a new
framework which extends the existing Android system and truly
isolates app-private data from different apps.
6.1 Existing solutions
Since there is no finer-grained protection upon public storage,
the data needs be carefully examined before saving to it. Presently,
there is no tool as far as we know capable of automating this check-
ing process, and the developers have to manually scrutinize their
code and keep sensitive data protected. The CERT Oracle Cod-
ing Standard for Java [31] states two coding guidances regarding
storing sensitive information:
• Encrypting data. Before an application saves sensitive in-
formation to public storage, it needs to be encrypted. Fol-
lowing this rule would mitigate most data leakage problems
(information may still be leaked through side-channels, like
file size), but unfortunately this rule is not correctly enforced
in practice. Though Android provides cryptographic API,
many developers make critical mistakes on using them, in-
cluding using ECB mode and non-random IV for CBC en-
cryption [24], and sensitive information from the encrypted
files could be partially or even fully revealed to attackers.
Ironically, even the developers of most popular apps make
critical mistakes and directly reveal the encryption keys [19].
What is worse, our research shows even developers correctly
use encryption routines, they do not always identify the sen-
sitive objects. As shown in Section 4.1, user’s account num-
ber and phone number e.g., are used as filenames, which can
be abused to infer a wide spectrum of users’ sensitive infor-
mation.
• Saving to internal storage. Android uses Ext2/4 for inter-
nal storage and an app can only access its own data from
internal storage. Therefore, it is encouraged to keep sen-
sitive data there. Specifically, data can be saved to a file
created in application data directory with permission set to
MODE_PRIVATE. However, developers would like to only
decide very sensitive data and throw all the other data to pub-
lic storage, such a habit mainly caused by history reasons
which are elaborated in Section 7.
Expecting all the developers to obey the security rules or fix se-
curity issues is impractical. On the other hand, users could protect
themselves: by converting the format of public storage from FAT
to Ext2/4, the built-in access control mechanism of Ext2/4 will
be inherited and storage of different apps will be well separated.
Yet, this migration might be only suitable for advanced users: the
Android system has to be rooted and additional apps have to be
installed to support Ext2/4 format public storage; Windows users
have to install additional software to browse and read files on it;
the existing files have to be backed up and restored when format-
ting. None of these steps are easy for common users.
6.2 Proposed framework
The problem will not be fixed in the near future if following these
paths described above. On the contrary, modifying the Android
Public Storage
App1
App2
App1 Private Data
Shared Folders
App2 Private Data
x
x
Original checkPermission Ownership Checker
Hooked checkPermission
Figure 9: Proposed defense framework, adding ownership
checker to restrict apps accessing other apps’ private data.
system and push the upgrades to users’ devices would be an easier
way to mitigate the security issues. For this purpose, we propose to
augment the existing security framework on public storage by in-
strumenting the API checkPermission() [5], the framework
is described as below:
Architecture. We design a new module named ownership checker
as shown in Figure 9, which works on Android Middleware layer
and can achieve mandatory access control (MAC) for app-private
data. Specifically, when the targets are public resources, like shared
music directory, the access is permitted (certainly, the app needs
to hold necessary permissions), while the targets are located in
app’s private folder, the access is only permitted when the calling
app matches the owner, if not, the ownership checker will return
PERMISSION_DENIED even if the app has requested the READ
or WRITE permission. To enforce such rule, we create a system
file owner_checker.xml storing the mapping between apps and re-
sources, similar to Access Control Lists (ACL) of Ext4 file system.
And the Android system code, which manages the checkPermission(),
are modified to read the mapping before actual file operations. An
exception will be thrown to the caller if a mismatch happens.
Ownership inference. The ownership mapping between apps and
resources needs to be established before actual access happens,
which, however, is not a trivial task. We have to deal with the sit-
uation that the public storage has already kept apps’ data before
our module is installed, while the owner of data is not tracked.
To fix the missing links, we exploit a caveat regarding naming
convention: an app usually saves data to a folder whose name is
similar to its package name. For example, Viber saves data to
∼/viber/ and its package name is com.viber.voip (app’s
UID and package name can be acquired from packages.xml under
/data/system). Therefore, we initialize the mappings by scan-
ning all the resources. For a given resource, we assign the owner
app if the resource location and app package name share a non-
trivial portion. To notice, this initialization step could not infer all
the ownerships when an app stores the data in a folder whose name
is irrelevant. While the access will be blocked for this case, we
provide an interface for users to add the ownerships. When a failed
access happens or the resource has no ownership associated, a di-
alog is prompted to user to ask if the access is permitted. If the
permission is granted, a new mapping will be added. To reduce the
hassles to users, the User-driven access control model [36] can be
integrated to automatically assign ownership based on user’s im-
plicit actions.
7. DISCUSSION
Evolvement of Android storage model. In the early stage, An-
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droid phone is equipped with limited onboard Flash memory (only
256MB for the first android phone, HTC Dream). In the meantime,
its storage can be expanded through large volume SD card (could be
several GB) which is usually shipped together. This storage model
forces Android app developers to save the most of the data to FAT
formatted SD card, while the sensitive information, like passwords,
is saved to more secured Ext2/4 formatted Flash memory. The size
of onboard Flash memory is gradually enlarged, however, the app
developers still prefer to use SD card, even forcing Android to sim-
ulate FAT format on a compartment of Flash memory. While keep-
ing compatibilty for existing apps reduce the workload for devel-
opers, it brings severe security and privacy risks, as shown in our
attacks. Notably, there have been continuous efforts on improv-
ing the security of storage model by Google, including introdu-
ing READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE permission in Android 4.1 and
WRITE_MEDIA_STORAGE in Android 4.4. Unfortunately, these
enhancements do not solve the fundamental issues with the stor-
age model. We proposed a new framework which enforces finer-
grained access control mechansims on the insecured part of storage
system (SD card and part of Flash memory simulating SD card).
This approach does not require changes from existing apps or in-
tensive efforts from users and could be easily applied.
Limitations of app study. We launched a study on existing apps
to understand the scale of the problem (see Section 4.2). We built a
tool running static analysis on app’s code and use a set of heuristics
to determine if the app saves sensitive information to unprotected
shared storage. This simple tool identifies a large number of po-
tentially vulnerable apps and show reasonable accuracy from our
sampling result. However, it is inevitably suffers from false nega-
tives (e.g., the file name does not contain the keywords we used)
and false positives (e.g., the information saved is not sensitive). We
leave the task of building a more accurate detector as future work.
8. RELATED WORK
Harvesting users’ sensitive data from mobile devices. Since mo-
bile devices now hold a lot of people’s private information, they
have become popular targets for attackers. Attacks like stealing
users’ chat history [19] have been proved their feasibility in the
real world. These attacks usually depend on certain vulnerabili-
ties identified from the victim apps. Instead, our attacks exploit a
general design flaw of Android system - the lack of finer-grained
control on shared storage, and we demonstrated the effectiveness
of attacks on a number of popular apps from different categories.
In addition to steal user’s sensitive information directly, a lot of
research focused on inferring user’s private information, especially
the location. Srivatsa et al. showed a set of users’ location traces
can be de-anonymized through correlating their contacts with their
social network friends’ list [39]. Using users’ public comments,
Zheng et al. showed it is feasible to infer users’ locations and ac-
tivities [43]. Also a recent work [44] by Zhou et al. targets to infer
information of users from more perspectives, including identities,
locations and health information. While their works exploit side
channels of Android system, our work takes advantage of the data
on shared storage and corresponding attacks are easier to carry out.
Inferring users’ information from social network. Social net-
works allow users to share information with their friend. It is an-
other hub of user sensitive information and its privacy issues have
been well studied in several previous papers [33, 41, 21, 28]. In [33],
Mislove et al. found that users with common attributes are more
likely to be friends and often form dense communities, and they
proposed a method of inferring user attributes that is inspired by
previous approaches to detecting communities in social networks.
Goga et al. proposed an attack to link the user’s identity to her
accounts on different social networks [28]. This attack exploits
only innocuous activity that inherently comes with posted content.
Also user’s group memberships [41] and the “friend finder” func-
tion [21] also could leak user’s identity (de-anonymization attack).
They studied how to use the network characteristics to infer the
social situations of users in an online society.
These works focused on social networks themselves, that is to
say, all analyzed data come from one or several social networks.
However our attack combines the sensitive data from users’ phones
(shared storage) and public data from social networks, which is
more powerful.
Protecting users’ privacy on mobile devices. To defend against
the existing or potential attacks tampering user’s privacy, a bunch
of defense mechanisms have been proposed. Roesner et al. pro-
posed user-driven access control to manage the access to private
resources while minimizing user’s actions [36]. Ongtang et al. pro-
posed a finer-grained access control model (named Saint) over in-
stalled apps [35]. It addressed some limitations of Android security
through install-time permission-granting policies and runtime in-
terapplication communication policies. Mobiflage [38], developed
by Adam Skillen et al., was leveraged to enable Plausibly Deniable
Encryption (PDE) on mobile devices by hiding encrypted volumes
within random data on a device external storage. Users are needed
to comply with certain requirements, but Mobiflage also has highly
risks to be weakened even if users follow all the guidelines which
makes it not practical. To protect users’ location, several methods
were proposed, like [37] which restrict the information disclosed
from locations.
Besides, efforts have also been paid on code analysis to block
the information leakage. Enck et al. developed TaintDroid [25]
to prevent users’ private data from being abused by third party
apps. DroidScope [42] is another dynamic Android malware anal-
ysis platform. Based on the idea of virtualization, it reconstructed
both the OS-level and Java-level semantics simultaneously and seam-
lessly.
9. CONCLUSION
It is known that the shared public storage on Android is inse-
cure, due to its coarse-grained access model. Therefore, it is highly
recommended that the sensitive data should be avoided from saving
there. In this paper, we carry out a large-scale study on exsting apps
on whether app developers follow this rule and the result turns out
to be glooming: a siginificant number of apps save sensitive data
into the insecure storage, some of the apps are even top ranked in
Android market. By exploiting these leaked data, it is possible to
infer a lot of information about the users, severely violating users’
privacy. The security of users’ data under current model heavily
rely upon app developers, but requiring all app developers identify
the sensitive objects and correctly handle it is impractical. Instead,
we propose a new defense framework by extending the existing An-
droid systems which achieve both compatibilty and finer-grained
access control. To summarize, our study reveals unneglectable se-
curity issues in shared storage and further actions need to be taken
to fix the problems.
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APPENDIX
A. THE VERSIONS OF THE 17 APPS IN-
STALLED ON OUR SMARTPHONES
App Name Version installed
Facebook 13.0.0.13.14
Instagram 6.2.2
Twitter 5.18.1
Linkedin 3.3.5
Vine 2.1.0
Weibo 4.4.1
Renren 7.3.0
Momo 4.9
WhatsApp 2.11.186
Viber 4.3.3.67
Skype 4.9.0.45564
Line 4.5.4
KakaoTalk 4.5.3
Tencent QQ 4.7.0
WeChat 5.2.1
EasyChat 2.1.0
Alipay 8.0.3.0320
B. THE DETAILS OF USER PRIVACY DATA
EXTRACTION
Viber is an instant messaging app with 300 Million users [1]. The
text file .userdata saved under∼/viber/.viber/ reveals a
lot of user’s information, including the user’s real name and phone
number. Besides, it also contains the path pointing to the user’s pro-
file photo, e.g. ∼/viber/media/User Photos/xxx.jpg.
WhatsApp is an instant messaging app with 450Million users [1].
The user’s profile photo is stored under the directory∼/WhatsApp
/.shared/, with file name tmpt. The profile photos of user’s
friends are saved under the directory ∼/WhatsApp/Profile
pictures/ after the profiles are viewed, and they are named by
profile owners’ phone numbers without any obfuscation.
Linkedin is a business-oriented social networking app with 300
Million users [12]. This app cache the photos into the directory
∼/Android/data/com.Linkedin.android/cache
/li_images/. Though the images stored under the directory can
be many, the user’s profile photo is unique in file size and modified
time. In general, the user’s profile photo is about 30KB, while oth-
ers are about 3KB (if the user does not see the HD profile photo).
KakaoTalk is an instant messaging app with 100 Million users [1].
If user A chats with user B, the app will create a content folder
has the same name in both the Android phones, under the path
∼/Android/data/com.kakao.talk/contents/. The
files on the two phones also have the same name (10 digital num-
bers), size and stored in the same path, like∼/Android/data/com.
kakao.talk/contents/14 digital numbers/xx/.
Tencent QQ is an instant messaging app in China with 816 Million
users [18]. Under the path∼/tencent/com/tencent/mobi-
leqq/, it is very easy for us to acquire a user’s QQ account from
the log file named as “com.tencent.mobileqq.xxx.log”.
Weibo is a Chinese microblogging service with 500 Million users
[15]. There is a file named by the user’s uid under the path∼/sina/weibo/page,
and we can acquire the user’s username and even her email address
if she used it to register her account.
Alipay is a online payment service in China with 300 Million users
[2]. We could find a user’s phone number from two cache files, one
is the _meta file in the directory∼/com.eg.android.Alipa-
yGphone/cache/, the file content reveals the user’s phone num-
ber directly, and also points out the other file in the same directory
which discloses the user’s phone number.
Renren is a social networking app with 194 Million users [13]. A
folder named by the user’ UID is stored in the directory∼/Andro-
id/data/com.renren.mobile.android/audio/cache
/JasonFileCache. Even user’ visit histories are also stored in
this folder, which contains the name, UID of user’s friends. The au-
dio files are named as the format UID+hash value, which also
disclose the user’s UID. We can find the user’s personal home page
by the URL http://www.renren.com/UID in a browser.
Momo is a location-based services instant messaging app with 100
Million users [8]. We can find a folder named as the user’s account
in the directory ∼/immomo/users/. Through searching the ac-
count number, we can not only get her Momo profile information,
but also infer her location and even track her.
EasyChat is an instant messaging app with 60 Million users [6].
The file pjsip_log.txt under the directory ∼/Yixin/log/
shows us all the call records information in plaintext. For example,
we can extract information “From: 8525984xxxx, To: 1471434xxxx,
Start: 2014-03-02 14:39:11, End: 2014-03-02 14:39:31”.
Audio files. Almost all the popular instant messaging apps, like
WhatsApp, Line, WeChat, Tencent QQ, and KakaoTalk, store the
audio files into shared storage directly without any process.
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